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SOUTHEAST ASIA AT THE CROSSROADS
In 1966, Robert F. Kennedy delivered a speech 
with this quote: ‘There is a Chinese curse which says 
“May we live in interesting times”. Like it or not, we live 
in interesting times. They are times of danger and 
uncertainty; but they are also the most creative of any 
time in the history of mankind.”
Today, in interesting times we live indeed. Donald 
Trump’s retreat from multilateralism and fierce 
confrontation with China is changing the political and 
economic landscape in the Asia-Pacific. Southeast Asia 
is caught in the middle, facing many challenges and risks. 
But we are at least forced to look ahead and be creative 
– and that is what RISE tries to do in this special issue, 
exceptionally in English.
Start with the concept of hedging. Is it a response 
to a perceived security risk or to an imminent threat? 
Depending on the answer, we can understand the 
behavior of ASEAN countries, some of them torn 
between an economic partnership with China and an 
increased political outreach to the United States. Then 
move to trade issues. Historically, Southeast Asia has 
been at the center of global political economy since the 
age of discoveries. If the global trade regime shows some 
faultlines, can these economies continue to thrive? At 
last, some of them could be the real beneficiaries of the 
China-U.S. trade war, and there are chances to overcome 
the ‘middle-income trap”, if certain conditions are met. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative can also become an 
opportunity, especially for public-private partnerships. 
And – as the official statement of the Thai Foreign 
Minister, currently holding the ASEAN chairmanship, 
shows – the fight against climate change is an area 
where Southeast Asia can be creative. 
On the occasion of the TO-ASEAN Business Days 
2019 in Turin, RISE welcomes a special section hosting 
the views on bilateral relationships with Italy offered by 
the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam. Will these nations be 
creative enough to sustain ‘the ASEAN miracle’? Find 
it out by reading the book by Kishore Mahbubani and 
Jeffery Sng reviewed in the final column.
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Time to Revisit
‘Hedging’
 by Jürgen Haacke  
A 
strong consensus has formed that many 
secondary states have adopted security strategies 
best categorised as ‘hedging’. This argument is 
most often made with respect to Southeast Asia. However, 
hedging remains a contested concept though few works 
acknowledge this. At least four conceptualisations of hedging 
can be distinguished.1 I posit that we are now at a crossroads 
in terms of how we make sense of hedging and how we apply 
relevant insights empirically.  
Arguments about hedging really took shape 
when scholars assessed responses by states in China’s 
neighbourhood to the latter’s re-emergence as an economic 
1  Haacke, J. (2019) ‘The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique 
and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework’. International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19(3). It is expected to be published online next June. The print 
version is not yet available.
and military power. Hedging was then advanced as an 
analytical category to convey the point that regional countries 
were generally resorting neither to conventional balancing nor 
bandwagoning strategies to manage China’s growing power. 
Hedging was widely taken to be an expression of positionality 
or alignment, in particular, in the context of Southeast Asian 
security strategies. In the eyes of some, however, hedging 
addressed uncertainty about China’s intentions and future 
policies and served the goal of maintaining a regional order 
led by the United States as regional states engaged the 
People’s Republic;2 for others, the ultimate purpose was 
regime legitimation.3
Although there are competing conceptualisations of 
hedging, the most popular is by now one which – broadly 
speaking – sees hedging as a portfolio approach. Several 
variants have been proposed. For instance, Evelyn Goh 
sees hedging strategies as encompassing balancing 
or containment elements alongside engagement and 
2 See the extensive works in that field by Evelyn Goh. Among all, Goh, E. (2016) ‘Southeast 
Asian Strategies toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging after All These Years?’, ASAN Special 
Forum, 22 February 2016; Id. (2005a) ‘Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian 
Regional Security Strategies’, Policy Studies 16, Washington, D.C.: East-West Center; Id. (2005b) 
‘Introduction’, in Id., ed., ‘Betwixt and Between: Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. 
and China’, IDSS Monograph No.7, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies.
3 Kuik, C.C. (2008) ‘The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising 
China’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30(2), pp. 159-185.
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reassurance components. Cheng-Chwee Kuik goes further and 
sees hedging as involving mixed and ‘opposite’ positioning, 
where states exhibit forms of both power-acceptance and 
power rejection.4 By comparison, Øystein Tunsjø regards 
hedging as merely constituting an intermix of co-operation 
and confrontation.5 In the context of their empirical studies, 
scholars tend to employ a basic version of hedging as a 
portfolio approach.6
Embracing this conceptualisation is consequential. First, 
even in the case of Kuik’s well-thought out work, it follows 
that all combinations of opposite behaviours short of ‘pure’ 
balancing and ‘pure’ bandwagoning should be understood 
to constitute hedging strategies. Given the supposed rarity of 
‘pure’ forms of these conventional security strategies, hedging 
really becomes a rather large ‘residual’ category. In other words, 
which countries are not hedging? There is another conceptual 
issue: most of those who identify hedging strategies tend to 
see states adopting indirect balancing moves, with some 
even considering hard balancing an aspect of hedging. Such 
a perspective leaves the distinction between balancing and 
hedging rather blurred. Methodologically, where authors 
point to indirect balancing as part of hedging, they tend to 
look for limited military strengthening – usually alongside 
economic engagement – as evidence of a hedging strategy. 
However, the underlying purpose of such strengthening is 
frequently not examined.
Instead of conceptualising hedging as a portfolio 
approach, it is also possible to conceive of it as a form of risk 
management.7 After all, we live in an age of risk8 in which, for 
some, even war has become an exercise in risk management.9 
Hedging would thus be a security strategy crafted to address 
major security risks. Notably, although the terms security threat 
and security risk are often used interchangeably, they should 
not be. Security risks are potential security threats. In other 
words, security risks are probabilistic and are consequently 
evaluated both in terms of their likelihood and potential 
magnitude. In contrast, security threats are imminent and 
well-defined challenges to security. If the management of risk 
is anticipatory and proactive, threats are normally associated 
with an action-reaction dynamic. It follows that perceived 
immediate state-based threats to the survival of the state or its 
major interests should be expected to prompt countervailing 
moves that are distinct from hedging.
4 See Ibid.; Kuik, C.C. (2016) ‘How do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ 
alignment behavior towards China’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25(100), pp. 500-514.
5 Tunsjø, Ø. (2017) U.S.-China Relations: From Unipolar Hedging to Bipolar Balancing, in R. S. 
Ross and Ø. Tunsjø, eds, Strategic Adjustment and The Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia, 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
6 See Hornung, J. W. (2014) ‘Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China’, Asian Security, 
Vol. 10(2), pp. 97-122; Le H. H. (2013) ‘Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since 
Normalization’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 35(3), pp. 333-68.
7 Ciorciari, J. D. (2019) ‘The Variable Effectiveness of Hedging Strategies’. International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 19(3). Published online on May 16, 2019. The print version is 
not yet available; Tunsjø, Ø. (2013) Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging against 
Risk, New York: Columbia University Press.
8 Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications.
9 Heng, Y. (2018) ‘The Continuing Resonance of the War As Risk Management Perspective 
for Understanding Military Interventions’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 39(4), pp. 544-558; 
Coker, C. (2009) War in an Age of Risk, Cambridge, Polity.
At this point, ascertaining hedging empirically requires 
a focus on how a security challenge is understood. If we are 
looking for indicators to judge, we should bear in mind that 
hedging by secondary states tends to be associated with 
limited military capabilities enhancement measures, but these 
should also not be concentrated on a specific contingency 
as this would be more likely signal balancing.10 If strategy is 
pursued in the context of triangular relations with two major 
powers, hedging should moreover involve ambiguity in terms 
of alignment signals communicated.11 More specifically, I 
argue that hedging involves alignment signalling that leaves 
open how a state would react should the potential security 
challenge materialise.
Depending on what conceptualisation of hedging we 
invoke, our empirical findings are likely to differ. Focusing 
on Southeast Asian countries, an understanding of hedging 
as a portfolio approach is likely to yield the conclusion that 
at least the majority of regional states are hedging, including 
Myanmar, Malaysia, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Singapore, and 
even the Philippines (at least under President Duterte’s 
Administration). As to whether Brunei Darussalam, Laos, 
Cambodia and Thailand would also be regarded as hedging 
might be more debateable. In some cases, this would depend 
– inter alia – on how much significance one attributes to 
any military co-operation these states have had with the 
United States or other powers. Nevertheless, the conclusion 
would likely be that most Southeast Asian states are hedging 
irrespective of the nature of the security challenges these 
states are facing and despite the different approaches 
they seem to be adopting to manage their main security 
challenges. To be sure, following the work of Kuik or Tunsjø, 
for instance, analytical differentiations could still be made for 
the countries one considers to be hedging: between light 
and heavy hedgers, or between countries that are taken to 
emphasise co-operation over confrontation or vice versa, 
and those where co-operation and conflict are more evenly 
balanced.
However, if we understand hedging to be about a 
response to a perceived security risk rather than an imminent 
threat and also take seriously the assumption that hedging by 
a secondary state in the context of its great power relations 
involves ambiguity in alignment signals (insofar as these relate 
to a major security challenge in question), our conclusions 
about which countries in Southeast Asia are hedging are likely 
to be different. While Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s respective 
responses to China’s security challenge in the South China Sea 
should be categorised as hedging, findings for countries such 
as Viet Nam, the Philippines, Myanmar and even Singapore 
might differ. Why? The internal balancing pursued by Hanoi 
and Manila in response to China’s actions raises questions 
10 For a discussion on this topic, see Liff, A. (2016) ‘Whither the Balancers? The Case for a 
Methodological Reset’, Security Studies, Vol. 25, pp. 420-459.
11 Lim, D. J. and Z. Cooper (2015) ‘Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia’, 
Security Studies, Vol. 24(4), pp. 696-727.
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about whether these governments still regard China’s security 
challenge in the South China Sea as constituting mere security 
risks. Moreover, even under President Duterte, there seems 
to be little ambiguity about how the security establishment 
of the Philippines prefers to position itself. In the case of 
Myanmar, judging by the recent response to the Kokang 
insurgency, there would also appear to be little ambiguity 
about how the military would likely react to the possibility 
of another major security challenge in northern Myanmar if 
Chinese authorities ever decided to pressure Naypyidaw by 
leveraging their relations with ethnic armed groups.
A particularly interesting case is Singapore, which tends 
to be regarded as the archetypal ‘hedging state’ because, 
as the official discourse has it, the city-state does not wish 
to choose between Beijing and Washington. On the other 
hand, Singapore has been quite forceful in its communication 
about how it perceives China’s challenge to international law 
and regional order, certainly as far the freedom of navigation 
is concerned. At least for the moment, there is also little 
ambiguity about how Singapore would respond should 
existing security challenges posed by China turn to clear-cut 
security threats. The city-state has for many years preferred to 
strengthen its relations and indeed its interoperability with 
the U.S. military in the first instance. Arguably, Singapore 
might therefore be seen to be in balancing mode against 
China.12 This is not to deny that Singapore, like other regional 
states, has to deal with a variety of security risks as far as China 
is concerned, including the possibility of a serious downturn 
in Sino-U.S. relations.
How we understand hedging – whether as a policy mix 
of co-operative and conflictive policies or as a response to 
a risk to a significant security referent – matters greatly. The 
literature has veered towards the former conceptualisation. It 
is time to debate whether, for analytical reasons, there would 
not be an advantage in returning to a focus on hedging 
as involving responses to security risks, that is, as such a 
conceptualisation at the very least forces us to investigate 
more closely how security challenges are really understood 
by those concerned.
12 Haacke, J. (2019) ‘The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia’, quoted.
East Asia’s
Trade Futures
in a Volatile World
 by Christopher Dent  
East Asia, Globalisation and World Trade
T
he world trade system has for centuries 
represented wider economic, political and 
technological developments shaping human 
society, as well as pointing to its future development. East 
Asia has always been important to this system, and in recent 
decades has become an ever stronger player in it. This does 
not just relate to the rise of China but also to other roles 
played by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia in 
shaping our trade and economic futures. 
Globalisation and the underlying technologies that have 
created it have made trade in most industries increasingly 
complex. It is technically companies that trade, not countries. 
Transnational enterprises from both inside and outside the 
region have created the ‘Factory Asia’ phenomenon, where 
international trade and production work closely together to 
help make East Asia core to the global economy.1 Globalisation 
has also forged deep economic interdependence in the 
region, and thereby de facto imperatives for East Asian states 
to co-operate with one another. However, China’s rise, and 
its more assertive foreign policy and globalising of its trade 
relationships, has presented significant challenges on this 
front. Furthermore, geopolitical developments outside the 
region – in particular the disruptive impacts of U.S. President 
Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign economic policy and 
the Brexit referendum outcome in Europe – have brought 
further complexities to the international trade environment in 
which East Asia finds itself.
Both the ‘Trump’ and ‘Brexit’ factors are causing many to 
predict a number of possible volatile outcomes. Both have 
become emblematic of a new phase of defensive economic 
nationalism and push back against globalisation.2 In this 
paper, I will discuss the ways in which the Trump and Brexit 
effects could impact on East Asia’s trade and world trade 
futures overall. 
1 Dent, C.M. (2017) ‘East Asian Integration: Towards an East Asian Economic Community’, 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) Working Paper Series No. 665, Tokyo: ADBI.
2 Best, J., et al. (2017) ‘International Political Economy meets the unexpected: Brexit, 
Trump and global populism’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 24(2), pp. 177-178; 
Hopkin, J. (2017) ‘When Polanyi Met Farage: Market Fundamentalism, Economic Nationalism, 
and Britain’s Exit from the European Union’, The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, Vol. 19(3), pp. 465-478; Livesey, F. (2018) ‘Unpacking the Possibilities of de-De-
globalisation’, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Vol. 11, pp. 177-187; Yadav, 
S.S. and Shankar, R. (2017) ‘Is de-globalization an option?’, Journal of Advances in Management 
Research, Vol. 14(3), pp. 254-255.
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East Asia’s Evolving Trade Agenda
East Asian governments have become increasingly active 
in trying to manage and govern their trade relationships 
at multiple levels. Trade continues to be a prime driver of 
economic development in the region. Various forms of 
industrial policies are still employed to enhance the trade 
capacity of exporting firms, especially in new emerging 
strategic sectors such as digital technology and clean energy. 
Sub-regional ventures such as the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion 
(GMS) project’ have included infrastructural trade capacity-
building measures (e.g. economic corridor and multi-model 
transport hub projects) designed to promote cross-border 
trading activity.3 The ASEAN Connectivity Initiative and China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seek to achieve the same outcomes 
by infrastructure-oriented methods.
The last two decades have also seen a proliferation of mainly 
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) among East Asian 
nations plus a spate of regional FTAs. In 1990, there were 
just 16 FTAs in force worldwide and no such agreements 
implemented in East Asia. Now there are around 400 FTAs 
registered with the World Trade Organisation, and East Asian 
governments have signed over eighty of these.
An important catalyst of this FTA trend was the 1997-98 
East Asian financial crisis, which exposed both the depth 
of regional economic interdependence and the lack of 
co-operation mechanisms to deal with mutual crisis 
situations.4 New FTA projects were initiated to help address 
these matters but the nature, content and effectiveness 
of these agreements have varied enormously. Those that 
have focused more on commercial regulatory areas (e.g. 
investment rights, intellectual property rights, technical 
standards, government procurement) rather than simply 
tariff liberalisation are viewed as relatively more useful to 
business.5 At the same time, the actual value-adding benefit 
of FTAs in terms of boosting trade and creating distributive 
prosperity has been questioned. FTA utilisation rates that 
measure the extent to which firms use these agreements 
have been generally low.6
However, there is a general consensus in East Asia that 
liberalisation and commercial regulatory convergence alone 
are not enough to deliver desired trade outcomes. The 
region’s predilection to frame FTAs as ‘economic co-operation 
agreements’, where development capacity-building measures 
are also incorporated, is reflected in the current Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. 
The same could not be said for the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific 
3 Dent, C.M. (2017) ‘East Asian Integration: Towards an East Asian Economic Community’, Asian 
Development Bank Institute (ADBI) Working Paper Series, No. 665, February 2017, Tokyo: ADBI.
4 Dent, C.M. (2006) New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
5 Dent, C.M. (2010) ‘Freer Trade, More Regulation? Commercial Regulatory Provisions in Asia-
Pacific Free Trade Agreements’, Competition and Change, Vol. 14(1), pp. 48-79.
6 Dent, C.M., (2016) East Asian Regionalism, 2nd Edition, London: Routledge.
Partnership (TPP), now superseded by the scaled down and 
later discussed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The aims of the RCEP, which 
draws inspiration from other East Asia centred ‘economic co-
operation agreement’ FTAs, are therefore more congruent 
with those of the aforementioned infrastructural diplomacy 
ventures such as China’s BRI.
The emphasis on development capacity-building is likely 
to remain a core feature of East Asia’s approach to trade 
diplomacy, not least because it is aligned with the region’s 
developmentalist ideologies. East Asia’s future trade agenda 
will also be increasingly shaped by global challenge issues like 
climate change, resource security and development divides. 
In the first half of the 2010s, a number of East Asian nations 
including Japan, China, South Korea and Singapore were 
engaged in the plurilateral ‘Environmental Goods Agreement’ 
(EGA) with over forty nations, which sought to liberalise trade 
in clean energy and other environmental products. These talks 
have been stalled since 2016, but as global challenges become 
more acute they will impinge more on East Asia’s future trade 
agenda through a combination of issue-linkage, commercial 
and socio-political pressures for action in these areas.
Trump, Brexit and East Asia’s Trade Futures
It is not the intent of this paper to discuss the various technical 
aspects of President Trump’s futile U.S.-China trade war.7 
Rather, the aim is to assess the wider ramifications of Trump’s 
trade nationalism for East Asia. The U.S.’s current retreat to a 
unilateralist, trade protectionist position is not new. There are 
striking similarities with how the United States behaved on 
the international trade stage not just in the 1930s but also 
for much of the late 19th century. At this time, America was 
much like China today – an emergent economic superpower 
causing structural disturbances in the global economic system 
and criticised for not taking on international responsibilities 
befitting its geo-economic weight. For example, in 1890, then 
President William McKinley raised the average tariff rate on U.S. 
imports to 50%, at a time when global tariff rates had been 
falling for some time. In the same year, Britain and France’s 
average tariffs were by comparison 5% and 8% respectively.8 
President Trump’s aggressive attempts to ‘leverage’ national 
economic interests are furthermore based on an outdated 
19th century ‘exports good, imports bad’ understanding of the 
world economy. This is not only damaging to the U.S. and East 
Asia but is also creating a broader geopolitical environment 
7 Dent, C.M. (2019) ‘Why there will be No Winners from a U.S.-China Trade War’, The 
Conversation, 16 January, available online at <https://theconversation.com/why-there-will-be-
no-winners-from-the-us-china-trade-war-109822>; Huenemann, R.W. (2017) ‘United States-
China Trade: President Trump’s Misunderstandings’, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Vol. 5(1), 
pp. 150-154.
8 Palen, M.W. (2010) ‘Protection, Federation and Union: The Global Impact of the McKinley 
Tariff upon the British Empire, 1890–94’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 
38(3), pp. 395-418.
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for tribal national conflict.9 The tension and uncertainty 
caused by this development will have significant negative 
impacts on East Asia’s trade.
The outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum10 is also 
indicative of a rising tide of defensive economic nationalism 
and has important historic parallels with the late 19th 
century. In the 1890s, after the world’s ‘Long Depression’ that 
stretched over the previous two decades, Britain adopted 
a ‘splendid isolation’ foreign policy of withdrawing from 
continental European affairs and concentrating on its own 
national economic plight in troubling times.11 This also 
included attempts to strengthen its imperial trade bloc as 
part of a post-recession strategy. The Brexit vote outcome 
of 2016 could be partly attributed to the economic austerity 
conditions caused by the post-2008 ‘Great Recession’ 
and populist dissatisfaction with globalisation. The U.K. 
government is currently peddling the idea of a ‘Global 
Britain’, just as it counterparts did in the 1890s. Depending 
on Brexit’s political outcome, it could open up possibilities 
for Britain to sign new trade deals with East Asian nations, 
and even potentially join the CPTPP – ironically, a trade 
agreement that President Trump withdrew the U.S. from. 
But this all depends on which of the ‘50 Shades of Brexit’12 
Britain will eventually opt for – if indeed it ever makes such a 
majority decision – and therefore what scope it will have to 
conduct an independent trade policy.13
A ‘soft shade’ Brexit involving only partial disengagement 
with European Union (EU) trade rules will limit London’s 
ability to pursue FTAs with East Asian nations. The May 
Government’s new ‘All of Asia’ policy14 signals that the region 
9 Irwin, D.A. (2017) ‘The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade Policy Could 
Backfire’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 96(3), pp 45-56; Skonieczny, A. (2018) ‘Trading with the Enemy: 
Narrative, Identity and U.S. Trade Politics’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 25(4), 
pp. 441-462; Stiglitz, J.E. (2018) ‘Trump and Globalization’, Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 40, pp. 
515–528.
10 When in June that year 51.9% ‘majority’ of those eligible Britons who voted expressed their 
desire to leave the EU.
11 Lacher, H. and Germann, J. (2012) ‘Before Hegemony: Britain, Free Trade, and Nineteenth-
Century World Order Revisited’, International Studies Review, Vol. 14, pp. 99–124.
12 Oliver, T. (2017) ‘Fifty Shades of Brexit: Britain’s EU Referendum and its Implications for 
Europe and Britain’, The International Spectator, Vol. 52(1), pp. 1-11.
13 Koutrakos, P. (2016) ‘Negotiating International Trade Treaties after Brexit’, European Law 
Review, Vol. 41(4), pp. 475-478.
14 Speech of Mark Field, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Asia and the Pacific, at 
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 14 August 2018, available online at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/minister-mark-field-speech-the-uk-and-all-of-
asia-a-modern-partnership>.
is a priority within a wider ‘Global Britain’ foreign policy 
framework. It has already approached Japan with the view 
of brokering a fast-track FTA post-Brexit, and Tokyo in turn 
has invited Britain to accede to the CPTPP. However, the net 
impact of Brexit is most likely going to be negative for both 
Britain and East Asia. By leaving the EU, Britain would also 
be withdrawing from the many FTAs the EU already has, or 
is currently negotiating, with East Asian nations. This will 
have deleterious effects on East Asian firms with commercial 
interests in Europe. It would take years of renegotiation for 
Britain to re-establish these FTA links bilaterally with East 
Asian countries. Moreover, an EU without Britain – by far its 
most globally connected member state – internationally 
weakens Europe’s regional community of states and, 
inevitably, EU trade links and diplomacy with East Asia.
More broadly, like Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine, Brexit is 
ultimately a rejection of international society ideals, and 
fundamentally represents a retreat to defensive economic 
nationalism that risks destabilising the world trade order. It 
may come to pass that Trump and Brexit will soon fade into 
the distance, and they were just one-off shocks to the system 
on the long bumpy road of globalisation. Alternatively, 
they may form part of a paradigm shift towards a neo-
Westphalian world and return to late 19th century great 
power politics, creating escalating tensions and a chain of 
events that will end in catastrophic global conflict, as it did 
just over a century ago. Trade interdependence is far more 
functionally integrated now than it was then, and countries 
are more bound together by ‘mutually assured production.’15 
Nevertheless, both Trump and Brexit in their own ways 
cause East Asian trade-dependent nations to be at least very 
uncertain about their shared economic futures in the current 
volatile world.
15 Katz, R. (2013) ‘Mutual Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China 
and Japan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92(4), available online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/china/2013-06-11/mutual-assured-production>.
A series of RISE’s articles can be read in English on New Mandala. Hosted by the Australian National University’s Coral 
Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, New Mandala provides anecdotes, analyses and new perspectives on Southeast Asia. 
Please, visit its website at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/
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U.S.-China Trade
War: Opportunities
and Risks for
Southeast Asia
 by Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller  
P
rior to his election President Donald Trump made 
it clear that he thought the U.S. suffered from bad 
trade deals entered into by his predecessors. He 
wanted fair trade instead of free trade without specifying 
exactly what he meant by that. Since his inauguration, 
initiatives have been launched to renegotiate trade 
agreements, and after some hesitation the U.S. has started 
to impose tariffs on imports from China, which has in turn 
retaliated. The two parties mix threats and negotiations 
blurring the picture, and for the first time in more than 30 
years, free trade between the U.S. and China is rolled back. The 
question is how fast and how deep this will be and whether 
the rollback will be permanent or revoked at a later day. For 
Southeast Asian countries it is of paramount importance to 
form a picture of how they will be involved; how much they 
will suffer and will opportunities open up for them.
Why a Trade War?
In the beginning of the 1980s China reformed its 
economy and the U.S. controlled its inflation. These two 
policy steps are inextricably intertwined. Conventional 
economics teaches that inflation targeting monetary policy 
introduced by the U.S. Federal Reserve System brought inflation 
down. The real reason was that China gradually emerged as 
the global manufacturing nation using its large workforce to 
lower prices on labour intensive, low cost goods, which the 
U.S. started to import. This was good for both the U.S. and 
China. Purchasing power rose for the American consumer, 
underpinning a fairly high economic growth. Jobs were 
created in China demonstrating to the Chinese citizens that 
economic reforms worked. It was a ‘plus-plus game.’ Gradually 
apprehension surfaced in the U.S. about the trade with China 
being unbalanced. Several administrations and voices in the 
Congress sought rebalancing without getting much to show 
for their travails.
The Trump administration’s arguments for a trade war 
with China fall into three categories: The U.S. has lost its 
position as a manufacturing nation; a large number of jobs 
have gone; and the trade balance is one-sided in China’s 
favour. A Congressional study1 has concluded that the U.S. 
share of global manufacturing value added has declined 
from 29% in the early 1980s to 18.1% in 2016. China’s share 
of global manufacturing output, which was negligible in 
1980, surpassed the U.S. share in 2008 and has steadied in 
the range of 25% to 26% since 2014. U.S. experienced the 
highest number of employees in manufacturing in 1979 with 
19.5 million to see a gradual fall to 17.1 million in 2001. Over 
the last 17 years, the decline has been manifest with 12.7 
million employees in manufacturing in July 2018.2 In 2017, 
the deficit on the U.S. trade balance reached USD375 billion 
– equal to around 2% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
This kind of statistics need, however, to be interpreted with 
a pinch of salt.
According to Deutsche Bank research3 looking at 
exports of American companies irrespective of whether 
they are operating in the U.S. or China and doing a similar 
calculation for Chinese companies reduces the deficit to 
10% of the official figure. The difference is that 97% of what 
Chinese companies export to the U.S. is manufactured in 
China and 3% by Chinese companies operating in the U.S. 
For American companies 33% is manufactured in the U.S. 
and 67% by their subsidiaries in China. A study by Peterson 
Institute for International Economy4 discloses that 86% of 
electronics products, 68% of other manufacturing, 63% of 
electrical equipment and 59% of machinery except electrical 
to be levied by U.S. tariffs came from multinationals and 
joint ventures rather than Chinese firms. The U.S.’ most 
important trading partners are China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, 
Germany,5 Korea, Britain, France, Italy, India, Taiwan, Brazil, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Viet Nam, Malaysia, 
and Singapore. China’s most important trading partners6 
are the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Australia, 
Malaysia, Viet Nam, Singapore, Britain, Thailand, India, Brazil, 
the Netherlands, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
France. The gravity theory of trade – countries trade mostly 
with neighbours – seems only partly true for the U.S. and 
China. The top five U.S. export items to China are soybeans, 
civilian aircraft, cotton, copper materials, Passenger vehicles 
(small engines).7
The top five China export items to the U.S. are cellphones 
and other household goods, computers, telecommunication 
equipment, computer accessories, toys-games/sporting 
equipment.8 In the first round of imposing tariffs (imports of 
1 Levinson, M. ‘U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective’, Congressional Research 
Service, 21 February 2018.
2 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, ‘All Employees: Manufacturing’, Economic Research., 3 
August 2018, available online at <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP>.
3 Newsletter (email) of 26 March 2018.
4 Lovely, M. E. and L. Yang, ‘Trumps Tariffs Primarily Hit Multinational Supply Chains, Harm 
U.S. Technology Competitiveness’, Peterson Institute for International Economy, Policy Brief, 
18-12 May 2018.
5 EU member states are shown individually. EU as a whole is the U.S. largest trading partner 
and China’s second largest after the U.S.
6 Due to the special role of Hong Kong it is left out. Statistically it is China’s second biggest 
and the U.S. nineteenth trading partner.
7 ‘What America Exports to China’, China Business Review, 15 May 2013.
8 ‘This is What the U.S. Imports from China’, World Economic Forum, 26 March 2018.
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USD30 billion), the U.S. selected industries such as aerospace, 
information and communications technology, robotics, 
industrial machinery, new materials, and automobiles.9 In 
its retaliation, China focused on agricultural goods selecting 
certain types of meat, fish, other seafood, dairy products, 
vegetables, fruits and grains. Both sides opted for a tariff size 
of 25%. The next round of tariffs will hit imports of USD200 
billion bringing about half of Chinas exports into play, but 
with a lower tariff – 10% – keeping the options of increasing 
it to 25% at a later stage open. As was the case for stage one, 
China has retaliated. Currently for both countries more than 
half of exports are included in the lists already in operation 
or announced. Trade wars hit economic globalisation 
because manufacturers in many countries contribute to the 
final good through intermediate goods. Recently, suppliers 
of intermediate goods (components) have increased their 
influence over manufacturers doing the final assembling.
The Global Supply Chain
Products sold to consumers are marked ‘made in XX’, but 
this is misleading. The final product bought by the consumer 
may have been assembled in 20 countries, but would normally 
have components from a large number of countries. After 
President Trump raised the issue of American jobs lost due to 
free trade, an analysis disclosed that a Ford Focus assembled 
in the U.S. – thus in everyday vocabulary an ‘American’ car – 
only got 40% of its components from the U.S. and Canada.10 
For economic growth and employment, it may matter more to 
deliver a large share of components used by other countries 
than doing the final assembling itself.
This is borne out by the automotive industry as analysed 
by Wilson Kia Onn Wong.11 He points out that ‘over the past 
thirty years, automotive component suppliers have steadily 
assumed ownership over the actual vehicle-making process, 
reducing automakers to mere assemblers, and being more 
focused on what they perceive to be higher value-added 
activities such as branding, marketing and international 
business expansion […] these suppliers and not their 
automaker clients are now the primary forces driving the 
revolution in automotive technology […] the world’s leading 
automotive components supplier, Bosch, posted 2015 
revenues of EUR70.6 billion overshadowing key automaker 
clients such as Renault with revenues of EUR45.3 billion.’
In Asia, a strong supply chain has been built with China 
importing intermediate goods to be assembled into final 
products for export to the U.S. According to Fitch Ratings,12 
9 ‘Trump just slapped tariffs on USD34 billion worth of Chinese goods – here’s the full list of 
products that will get hit’, Business Insider Singapore, 6 July 2018.
10 ‘How American Is Your Car’, Time Magazine, 2 March 2017.
11 Wong, W.K.O. (2018) Automotive Global Value Chain, Abingdon: Routledge.
12 ‘Who Will be The Winners and Losers in a China-U.S. Trade War?’, The South China Morning 
Post, 4 April 2018.
countries most likely to be hit via the supply chain by a 
trade war are South Korea, Japan and Taiwan which supply 
China with semiconductors, and Viet Nam and Malaysia 
which supply China with machine parts and components for 
communications equipment.
Implications of Trade War on
the Asian Supply Chain
The trade war will suppress economic growth. 
International Monetary Fund’s Chief Economist stated in July 
2018 that if threatened trade barriers become reality, global 
output could drop by about 0.5% with the U.S. economy 
being ‘especially vulnerable.’13 In September 2018 a Chinese 
official stated that with the U.S. imposing tariffs on all Chinese 
imports the negative impact on China’s economy is about 
0.7% of GDP.14 This does not reflect the full picture as domestic 
economic policy measures can be introduced to compensate 
for the trade war’s negative growth effect.
So far, news is out that China contemplates to stimulate 
the economy while the U.S. will compensate farmers to 
soften the fall in growth. A fair bet is a short-term, direct 
insignificant (negative) impact on American and Chinese 
growth. Repercussions on economic growth in other 
countries including Southeast Asia will be minimal and will 
be nothing compared to what was seen during the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008. 
More significant and more interesting for Southeast Asia is 
the indirect impact over a longer term. The negative effect 
on Southeast Asia stems from higher consumer prices in the 
U.S. due to tariffs, which dampens consumption. The spill 
over happens because the final product marketed in the 
U.S. is ‘made in China’ through components imported from 
other Asian countries. Asia’s intra-regional trade accounts 
for 57.3% of total trade and is going up.15 A considerable 
part of this are components going to China. Intraregional 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen as a share of total 
FDI from 48% in 2015 to 55% in 2016.16 One of the drivers is 
expectation among Southeast Asian companies that access 
to the U.S. market would continue to be open to Chinese 
goods, guaranteeing Chinese demand for components. They 
have invested accordingly. The overall impact may not be 
significant, but some companies whose future is within the 
Asian supply chain that produces for consumption in the U.S. 
with China doing the final assembling may suffer.
The positive effects fall into three categories: opportunities 
to replace Chinese goods on the American market; American 
13 “Trade War Imperils World Growth as IMF Sees ‘Complacent’ Markets”, Bloomberg, 16 July 
2018.
14 Vice Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, Fang Xinghai, quoted in the 
Straits Times, 19 September 2018.
15 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Economic Integration Report, 2017.
16 Ibid.
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goods on the Chinese market; and the prospect of East 
Asia moving towards a self-sustaining economic entity with 
its own business cycle and producing more and more for 
domestic consumption. On the American market, tariffs 
lead to trade diversion. Southeast Asian products will be less 
expensive as they are not hit by the trade war. The size of this 
effect depends on congruity between Southeast Asian and 
China production determining how many products from 
the two ‘regions’ compete with each other; or seen from the 
American consumer’s point of view, whether Chinese goods 
were preferred to Southeast Asian goods because they were 
cheaper or because there were no alternatives. Only in the 
first case may U.S. imports switch from coming from China to 
having Southeast Asia as the source. Trade diversion will take 
place and may over time be visible, but history tells us that 
it will not happen overnight and will in fact require a strong 
effort by Southeast Asian producers to market their products. 
As an example of possible trade diversion in Southeast Asia’s 
favour is Malaysia’s export to the U.S. of electronic equipment 
(USD9.4 billion) and machinery (USD2.4 billion)17 which may 
see increased market shares. A similar picture is expected 
for the Philippines.18 On the Chinese market, a similar trade 
diversion will be seen as China retaliates by raising barriers 
for U.S. products. The Chinese list of retaliations include 
agriculture and resources, where Southeast Asia may offer 
alternatives to American products, making it likely that 
benefits will flow faster and be stronger. 120 food products 
have been mentioned as being on the Chinese list. China 
buying liquified natural gas (LNG) from the U.S to close the 
trade gap, explicitly mentioned by Secretary of Commerce 
Wilbur Ross on 23 March 201819 may be the victim of a trade 
war – at least in the short-term – and open up for more energy 
exports from Southeast Asia to China.
Another Southeast Asian product to gain may be palm 
oil which will replace soybeans imported by China from the 
U.S. For Southeast Asia, a trade war offers the opportunity 
of concentrating on the East Asian supply chain producing 
for East Asia. Knowing that growth and consumption will be 
higher in East Asia than for the U.S., such a prospect may not 
be so bad. The growing importance of components suppliers 
(the automotive industry mentioned as an example above) 
may in the longer run turn out to be beneficial. It will only be 
the case, however, if components suppliers realise the change 
in the role of components from simple inputs to playing a role 
in the definition of the final product. A mindset shift may be 
required from delivering a component designed and ordered 
by the final producer to perceiving how the component 
can enhance the performance of the final product, turning 
component suppliers into partners in designing the final 
product. If this is done, the trade war may help Southeast Asia 
climb up the value-added ladder as a component supplier. 
17 See <http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_malaysia_exports.html>.
18 See <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/PHL/Year/2015/TradeFlow/
Export/>.
19 ‘Wilbur Ross to China: Import More U.S. Gas to Cut Trade Gap’, Bloomberg, 22 March 2018.
The possibility of shifting assembling of goods from China 
to Southeast Asian countries cannot be ruled out, but such 
a step will take time and runs the risk of the U.S. reacting by 
imposing tariffs on Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
The trade war will primarily hit consumers in the U.S., 
multinational companies operating in China, and Chinese 
producers. Growth in the two countries will fall slightly. Some 
economic sectors in Southeast Asia may suffer in the short 
term, but overall the repercussions on Southeast Asia may 
in the medium and long-term be positive. In the long-term 
reinforcing the regional supply chain in East Asia to spread 
to all of Asia, will gain further strength with severe economic 
and political costs for the U.S. Asian countries will move 
towards a regional supply chain with rules defined by them in 
accordance with their own interests. Maybe the biggest loser 
over time will be American multinationals and the biggest 
winner Southeast Asia.
This article was published on 16 October 2018 by the ISEAS-
Yusof Ishak Institute – Institute of Southeast Asia Studies (ISEAS), 
Singapore, and may be republished with attribution. The original 
article is accessible at <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/
pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_64@50.pdf>.
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Reducing the 
infrastructure gap 
in the ASEAN region: 
Public-Private 
Partnership and 
the Belt and
Road Initiative
 by Tomaso Andreatta  
T
he need for infrastructure in Asia has significantly 
grown. The Asian Development Bank (ABD) has 
estimated this need to be USD2.8 trillion between 
2016 and 2030.1 This is more than USD180 billion a year, or 
USD3.17 trillion (USD210 billion a year), if adjusted to cope 
with climate change. ASEAN states have agreed a plan – the 
‘Masterplan on ASEAN Connectivity’ – to highlight main 
priorities.2 Traditional sources of funding, including the 
National State Budget and Official Development Aid (ODA), 
cannot cover these amounts, even with the support of the 
local banks and capital markets. So, there is a need for new 
sources. The ‘funding gap’ calculated by PwC3 is USD92 billion 
a year, more than half of the total amount. The private sector is 
the first port of call, given the size of global markets and their 
currently favourable disposition to invest in Southeast Asia and 
in infrastructure, especially if sustainable.
Another alternative has emerged: China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). On top of its previous international support, this 
is a financial program to build roads, ports, airports, railways, 
and industrial zones to enhance commerce and value-chain 
creation between China and forty countries among Europe, 
Africa and Southeast Asia.
Common Issue, Different Needs
Each country and region has different needs, as cities and 
rural areas would have. From completing basic infrastructure 
in Myanmar, Laos, rural Cambodia, and in some provinces of 
the Philippines and Indonesia, to upgrading them for all the 
1 ‘Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs’, ADB Report, February 2017, available online at 
<https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs>.
2 See ‘Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity to 2025’, November 2018, available online at 
<https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Master-Plan-on-ASEAN-Connectivity-20251.
pdf>.
3 PwC, ‘Understanding Infrastructure Opportunities in ASEAN 2018’. Infrastructure Series 
Report 1, 2017, available online at <https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/cpi-
mas-1-infrastructure-opporuntities-in-asean-201709.pdf>.
other counties in order to keep up with economic growth. 
Meanwhile, all countries in ASEAN (except for Singapore, 
which has fully developed infrastructure) need to build the 
infrastructure they cannot afford by themselves. In part, new 
demand for infrastructure is driven by fast urbanisation and 
economic activity growth (in industry and agriculture), in part 
by the rise of the middle class with higher standards of living, 
and finally by the need to enhance physical and information 
connectivity. 
The absolute size of the GDP is comparable to the total 
cost of the infrastructure being planned, and the average 
investment need is almost 6% of GDP a year.4 However, the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio in some ASEAN countries is 
already high, so they cannot borrow more than they used to 
spend . Generally, ASEAN countries are inefficient in collecting 
taxes. Their tax rates are difficult to raise (Corporate Income 
Tax ranges from between 17% in Singapore to 30% in the 
Philippines, VAT from 5% to 10%), while corruption prevents 
improving tax collection and increasing social security cost. 
This, coupled with the fear of investor flight, works to keep 
rates relatively low.5 PwC’s study further indicates the states 
that can finance by themselves is, at most, 50% for the cost of 
new infrastructure.
Local banks, who are usually also the main investor in 
government banks, have a capacity of investment limited by 
the capital size and the serious maturity mismatch. Whereas 
Vietnamese, Malaysian and Thai banks’ assets are around 130% 
of GDP, Indonesian ones do not reach 40%.6 In most ASEAN 
countries, the amount of institutional investors like pension 
and investment funds is very small and continue to invest 
mostly in government bonds, so their additional contribution 
to infrastructure investment is capped by growth rates.
ODA outstanding total commitments from multilateral 
institutions to ASEAN countries is over USD10 billion for 
ADB and a comparable amount for the World Bank. Other 
governments’ commitments are led by China, Japan, the 
US, Germany, France, and the European Union for a total 
commitment of USD9 billion.7 While Europeans tend to offer 
untied aid, the other countries in the list ask it to be spent to 
buy products and services generated in their country.
In some countries, their graduation to a ‘middle-income 
country’ has augmented the situation, with the money now 
coming only in the form of debt instead of a grant. This 
is the case of Viet Nam. For the World Bank, last year it was 
upgraded to the new status and it is set to do be upgraded 
4 ‘Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs’, quoted.
5 Viet Nam lowered its CIT from 24 to 20% at the beginning of this decade and currently 
plans to cut further to 15-17%.
6 Latest data provided by The Global Economy.com, available online at <https://www.
theglobaleconomy.com/>.
7 ‘Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries’, OECD 
Report, 28 February 2018, available online at <http://www.oecd.org/fr/cad/
financementpourledeveloppementdurable/geographical-distribution-of-financial-flows-to-
developing-countries-20743149.htm>.
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soon by the ADB. Many European donors, especially the UK 
and Scandinavian countries, closed their activity in Viet Nam. 
The ‘Paris COP 21 agreements’ on climate change gave new 
life to ODA, which now is funneled to the region specifically 
for this purpose.
Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
There is a wall of money in world financial markets 
ready to be deployed in PPP form to fulfill these tasks, but a 
set of conditions need to be put in place before this money 
materialises. The barriers are in regulation, government 
reliability, and supporting institutions:
Regulation: Laws on PPP do exist in many countries, but 
usually they do not offer bankable contracts to the developer/
operator because risks are all thrown onto the private side. 
The regulation of markets for services/utilities often do not 
allow for private operators to enter a market where there 
is a public monopoly controlled by the same government 
authority that regulates the market. Meanwhile, rules of local 
ownership may crowd out foreign operators or State control 
may be protected by law, even if ASEAN rules aim to open 
up for majority stakes for member State companies,8 and the 
lack of an efficient system to deal with bankruptcy increases 
the risk of loss. Lastly, the level of tariffs may not allow for the 
recovery of the capital invested, as in the case of electricity 
in Viet Nam and Indonesia where the tariff barely covers the 
cost of operation.
Government: This is the highest source of risk, specifically 
sudden changes of policy. While a reliable and stable policy 
reduces risk substantially, there are recent examples of 
nationalisation in the Philippines.There, the power purchase 
agreement for electricity from private producers is conceived 
to allow the electricity monopolist to renegotiate the whole 
structure of fees in case of a crisis. Another serious deterrent 
is the many permits necessary to start a project. In addition 
to using a lot of precious time before construction starts, thus 
increasing risk, it sets the ground for corruption which can add 
up to 30% of the cost.
Institutions: Local capital markets, banks and other 
local consultants involved lack the technical expertise and 
experience (since it was hardly done before) to evaluate the 
risk of PPP projects. Therefore, they either stay out or make 
investment decisions based on perceived or patent political 
support, which does not have the legal status of guarantees.
8 In some cases, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) helps in bringing money from one 
country to the next: FDI of regional leading utilities into other countries: Manila Water and 
Metro-Pacific Investments from the Philippines, Viettel of Viet Nam, Axiata Group from Malaysia, 
Singapore Telecom, EGAT of Thailand all bought stakes in similar business neighbouring 
countries’ utilities see, ‘Southeast Asia Burgeoning Infrastructure Market Defies Borders’, Nikkei 
Asian Review, 29 January 2019.
Most ASEAN countries are working at improving at least 
some of these conditions, with the help of multilateral banks 
and the private sector advocating for pro-market measures 
to rebalance risks, reduce arbitrary decisions, and strengthen 
local institutions. Moreover, they make it possible to benefit 
from the services of international institutions. Each Southeast 
Asian government should find a balance between the desire to 
promote local companies and the larger, faster and often more 
resilient performance of international companies.
The BRI
The BRI is a great project worth close to USD1 trillion. A 
large proportion of ODA, blended with Chinese private capitals, 
was disbursed to build interconnectivity between China and 
the regions around it. Through the BRI, China aims to conquer 
the heart of the countries touched by the project, thanks to the 
many infrastructure projects built in each nation, and thereby 
opening the economies to Chinese FDI and Chinese products.
It is clear that this is additional to the many initiatives 
countries have already taken and it comes in a context of 
much-increased flow of trade, investment and tourism out of 
China into the region.
Several ASEAN countries have political issues with their 
gigantic neighbour. Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia contested control of tiny islands in the South China 
Sea, since this would grant control of the immense submarine 
reserves of oil and gas, of fishing rights and of the commercial 
shipping routes. In addition, the Vietnamese population has 
not forgotten the 1979 war with China, in which Chinese 
Communist troupes arrived at 50 km of the capital Hanoi. Each 
ASEAN country is touched by several infrastructure projects:9
- Cambodia: The 190 km, USD1.8 billion highway from 
Sihanoukville to Phnom Penh is supported by China Road 
and Bridge. Cambodia is the most open country in the 
region to Chinese investment, including in the energy 
sector.
-  Laos: China Exim Bank is expected to spend up to 70% of 
the China-Laos High-Speed Rail Link cost.
-  Philippines: the new Manila Bay will be a smart city 
jointly developed by Chinese and Filipino partners.
- Malaysia: Central government launched the Digital Free-
Trade Zone, a logistics hub supported by Alibaba, KLIA and 
Cainao Holdings.
9 Summary Report, ‘Making the Belt and Road Initiative Work for ASEAN’, Singapore Institute 
of International Affairs, August 2018, available online at http://www.siiaonline.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/Summary-Report_Making-the-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-work-for-Asean.pdf; 
Sarah Chan cites 25 projects for a total value of USD12.4 billion in the Philippines, nine projects 
in Indonesia worth USD26.2 billion and twelve projects in Malaysia worth USD26.2 billion. in 
Chan, S. (2018) ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for China and East Asian Economies’, 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 35(2), pp. 52-78, available online at <https://rauli.cbs.
dk/index.php/cjas/article/view/5446>.
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- Indonesia: The Kalibaru expansion of the Tanjung Priok 
Port should cost USD3.97 billion, with the participation of 
Ningbo Zaoshan Port Company.
- Brunei Darussalam: The Muara Petrochemical Refinery is 
valued at USD15 billion and it is now controlled by Zhejian 
Hengyi Company, supporting Brunei at a time when 
Western companies are deterred by the Islamic turn of the 
government and the expected end of its oil reserves.
- Myanmar: The Kyaukpyu Deepwater Port will be part of 
a special economic zone, controlled by China’s State-run 
Citic Group for up to 75 years. Due to local government’s 
concerns about excessive debt, the project has scaled 
down to USD1.3 from 7.2 billion.
- Thailand: The Eastern Economic Corridor is a USD5 billion 
smart digital hub and economic zone, supported by HNA 
Innovation Finance.
- Viet Nam: Hanoi’s Cat Linh-Ha Dong Metro Line would 
value USD868 million.
Some countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Cambodia have chosen to join the BRI with great publicity and 
explicit documents. In particular, the Philippine government 
has given high visibility to its good relationship with China.
Yet these apparently win-win projects have incurred 
local resistance and other political hurdles, most commonly 
the concern that too much money coming in the form of 
bilateral debt and not from a multilateral institution may 
bankrupt the country or provide an excuse to take over land 
assets, as it happened in Sri Lanka with the Hanbantota Port. 
This port was built with Chinese money, but Sri Lanka could 
not pay the installment debt so they were forced to give it to 
China for 99 years.
In most countries, Chinese workers moving in to realise 
the infrastructure were perceived as displacing the local 
workforce. In Viet Nam, which has not officially signed any 
BRI declaration, three special economic zones with unusual 
lease length – 90 vs the usual 50 years – were met with street 
rallies assuming they were meant for Chinese companies, an 
extremely rare event in that country. Yet it seems to be clear 
that Viet Nam has to be on good terms with China, not only 
for the flow of direct investment (for example, in textile and 
furniture industries), but also for the number of tourists, and 
the support that Chinese buyers give to the real estate market 
bubble. On top of this, China is already the largest supplier of 
goods, machinery and raw materials, and after being a minor 
buyer of Vietnamese goods for a long time, since 2018 it has 
become the largest importer.
Myanmar blocked a large power station already in 2011 
and asked to scale down the Deepwater Port project due to 
the fear of over-indebting itself.
There are also risks for the Chinese partners, who are 
exposed to project delays in construction or failure to become 
economically viable (as was the case of the Sri Lankan port) 
with bad debt piling in the balance sheet of the Chinese banks.
However, there seems to be always a winner: Singapore, 
thanks to its well-developed institutions and expertise in 
private projects, strong institutions such as capital markets and 
international arbitration court, is well positioned to benefit in 
both cases, regardless of the source of funds, by supporting 
the PPP projects and also Chinese-led international projects.
Conclusion
It is clear that ASEAN countries cannot let pass the 
opportunities given by co-operating with the local and 
international private sector, or miss out on taking advantage of 
China’s ‘Marshall Plan’ for its all neighbours.
Most ASEAN countries, except Singapore, are more at home 
with government-to-government relationships, but several are 
afraid of an excessive dependence on a single country. That 
is why they have developed ASEAN and, especially Viet Nam, 
created an impressive network of free trade agreements.
Working with the private sector requires a daunting 
change in mentality and in legal rules. Viet Nam did some Build 
Operate Transfer (BOT) structures for roads and power stations 
under an old law in the early 2000s, but the new one on PPP 
has only been successful in drawing the money of some local 
companies with political ties supported by state-owned banks. 
By the way, the well-being of the citizen and their increasing 
spending capacity that enables them to pay for the services 
they receive, and economic growth that in ASEAN has 
surpassed 5% for many years (and is a great social stabiliser) 
are tilting the balance towards change.
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A Trap on
the Road to High
Income in ASEAN
 by Michele Boario  
L
ooking at the world economy through the lenses 
of the Gross National Income (GNI) per-capita it is 
possible to identify four categories. The first one 
encompasses low-income countries,1 below USD995 GNI per 
capita, still affected by the poverty trap. The second group 
comprises countries which attained middle-income level 
(between USD996 and USD12,055 GNI per capita) long time 
ago,2 but then they were not able to keep on growing. Many 
examples for this category are in Latin America. The third 
group consists of countries which have recently came to or 
are approaching the middle-income level. Several economies 
of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and China are included in this group. The last category is 
composed of high-income countries, with a GNI per capita 
above USD12,056, such as the members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).   
The key economic challenge for most countries in group 
2 is how to avoid the so called ‘middle-income trap’ (MIT)3 and 
advance to a high-income level. Starting from a brief analysis of 
the growth trajectories of ASEAN economies, the article aims 
to answer this question exploring the determinants of the ‘trap’ 
and discussing policies proved successful in other countries to 
avoid or escape stagnation after reaching middle income level.
ASEAN economic growth
Located at the center of the most dynamic economic 
area in the world – the Indo-Pacific region – ASEAN keep on 
1   World Bank Country and Lending Group, available online at <https://datahelpdesk.
worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.
2   More than 50 years ago in many cases.
3   Tran, V.T. (2013) ‘The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations’, ADBI Working Paper 421, Tokyo: ADBI, available online at <http://
www.adbi.org/working-paper/2013/05/16/5667.middle.income.trap.issues.asean/>.
showing a good economic performance. The average annual 
GDP of its members grew at 5.3% in the period 2000-2017. 
Some countries did better than others. In particular, the new 
members of ASEAN, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet 
Nam (CLMV), at a low middle income level (GNI per capita 
USD996-3895) have been growing faster reducing per capita 
income gaps with other member countries. 
The average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
in ASEAN moved from being nearly three times that of CLMV 
in 2000 to less than two times in 2017 when calculated in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The rapid growth of CLMV has 
also been associated with dramatic reductions in poverty. 
Notwithstanding these achievements, different kinds of intra-
country inequities remain high or have increased, including 
across rural and urban areas or center and periphery, along 
ethnic and religious lines, and between genders. As a result, 
polarization, both economic and social, is increasing. These 
factors can threaten cohesion and pose major risks to social 
stability, and growth itself, as well as the poverty elasticity of 
growth.4 An even bigger threat to CLMV growing potential is 
MIT that will be analysed in the following paragraphs.
ASEAN founding members, with the notable exception of 
the Philippines, performed better in the last decades of the 20th 
4   Menon, J. (2012) ‘Narrowing the Development Divide in ASEAN: The Role of Policy’, ADBI 
Working Paper 100, Tokyo: ADBI, available online at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/30403/reiwp-100.pdf>.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator (WDI)
GNI per capita 217, Atlas method (current USD)
Source: World Bank, WDI
CLMV GDP growth (annual %)
Source: World Bank, WDI, (based on author’s elaboration)
Convergence CLMV ASEAN 
GDP Per Capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $)
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century. Thailand GDP growth was above 10% in the period 
1987-1997,5 then abruptly plummeted during the Asian crises 
and never reached again the same performance. The average 
GDP growth in the last 15 years was around 4%. Malaysia 
and Indonesia followed a similar path. All three countries are 
currently struggling to escape MIT and testing policies to 
regain strong growing momentum. Looking at the per capita 
GNI of upper middle-income ASEAN countries relative to the 
U.S. level,6 Malaysia and Thailand rapidly caught up with the 
U.S. during 1985-1997, but the catching-up was much less 
impressive in 1998-2008. The recent performance of Indonesia 
has also been poorer than in preceding periods.
The Philippines did not share the same economic path 
with the previous three ASEAN founders. In the 1990s, during 
the roaring years of Thailand and Malaysia, the archipelago 
was considered as the ‘sick man of Asia’,7 while in the last five 
years its macroeconomic performance improved significantly 
with an annual GDP growth close to 7%.8 To certain extent its 
growing trajectory is closer to the CLMV one showing a better 
performance in recent years than the last decades of the 20th 
century. Singapore, another founding member of ASEAN, is 
an out layer. It was able to continue its remarkable growing 
trajectory avoiding the MIT and reaching high-income 
level already in 1991. Recently it became one of the richest 
countries in the world with a GNI per capita over USD54,000 
(2017).9 Brunei reached high-income level in 1989 and a GNI 
per capita close to USD30,000 in 2017. Overall, despite the 
good economic performance, most ASEAN members, except 
for Singapore and Brunei, find themselves trapped or at risk of 
being trapped in a scheme in which growth based on low cost 
comparative advantage is reduced as incomes grow.
5   See Databank World Bank, available online at <https://data.worldbank.org/>.
6   Tran, V.T. (2013) ‘The Middle-Income Trap’, quoted.
7   Press statement of Motoo Konishi, Co-Chair Philippines Development Forum, Davao City, 6 
February 2013, available online at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2013/02/06/
Press-Statement>.
8  Philippines, DataBank, available online at <https://data.worldbank.org/country/
philippines>.
9  Singapore, DataBank, available online at <https://data.worldbank.org/country/
singapore>.
The middle-income trap and its determinants
A growing body of economic literature has focused on 
the MIT,10 different definitions have been proposed, and the 
phenomenon has been analysed from different perspective.11 
Some scholars even challenged the very existence of MIT12 
arguing that it is possible to identify development traps at all 
level of income. Gill and Kharas first used the term MIT,13 in 
2007, referring to countries squeezed between the low wage 
poor-country competitors that dominate in mature industries 
and the rich-country innovators that dominate in industries 
undergoing rapid technological change. In the words of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), MIT is a situation where a 
middle-income country can no longer compete internationally 
in standardised, labor-intensive goods because wages are 
relatively too high, but it is also not ready to compete in higher 
value-added activities due to relatively low productivity.14 
The phenomenon happens when wages in a country rise 
to the point that growth potential in export-driven low-skill 
manufacturing is exhausted before it attains the innovative 
capability needed to boost productivity.
More in detail, the process of getting stuck in MIT15 can 
be explained with the following steps. As economies move 
from low- to middle-income status, they can compete 
internationally by moving from agricultural to labor-
intensive, low-cost manufactured products. Using imported 
technologies, late-developing economies reap productivity 
gains as workers shift from the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sector. Eventually, the pool of transferable 
unskilled labor is exhausted, or the expansion of labor-
absorbing activities peaks. As countries reach middle-income 
levels, real wages in urban manufacturing rise or market share 
is lost, and gains from importing foreign technology diminish. 
The emergence of a ‘Lewis Turning Point’ – with wages rising 
faster than the rate of inflation – often signals a coming MIT. 
The result is slow growth, stagnant or falling wages, and a 
growing informal economy.
Most empirical studies on MIT shows how developing 
countries face a declining productivity growth and struggle 
to boost total factor productivity (TFP) when they reach 
middle-income level.16 TFP refers to the efficiency with which 
10   Glawe, L., Wagner H. (2016), ‘The Middle-Income Trap – Definitions, Theories and 
Countries Concerned: A Literature Survey’, Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA), Paper No. 
71196, available online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71196/>.
11   Paus, E. (2014) ‘Latin America and the Middle-Income Trap’, ECLAC, Financing for 
Development Series, No. 250, available online at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2473823>. 
12   Bulman D., Eden M., Nguyen H. (2017) ‘Transitioning from Low-Income Growth to High-
Income Growth: Is There a Middle-Income Trap?, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 22(1), 
pp. 5-28.
13   Gill, I., Kharas H., (2007) An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth, Washington 
D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
14   Paus, E. (2017) ‘Escaping the Middle-Income Trap: Innovate or Perish’, ADBI Working 
Paper 685, Tokyo: ADBI, available online at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/231951/adbi-wp685.pdf>.
15   Agénor P.R., Canuto O., Jelenic M. (2012) ‘Avoiding Middle-Income Growth Traps’, PREM 
Network No. 98, available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/
Resources/EP98.pdf>.
16   Kim, J., Park J. (2017) ‘The Role of Total Factor Productivity Growth in Middle-Income 
Countries’, ADBI Economics Working Paper Series 527, Tokyo: ADBI, available online at <https://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/383176/ewp-527.pdf>.
Source: World Bank, WDI
GDP growth (annual %)
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capital and labor are combined to produce added value.17 TFP 
reflects the development of production, process technologies 
and ideas. It represents the residual growth once the specific 
contribution of capital and labor have been identified. In the 
literature on MIT, TFP is regarded as one of the most significant 
elements for economic growth. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 
found that, on average, the decrease in TFP growth rate 
explains around 85% of the growth slowdown in their sample 
of countries trapped at the middle-income level, while the 
decreases in labor and capital growth only play a small role.18
TFP growth, in turn, can be explained by a host of 
factors. A recent regression run by ADB identified human 
capital and R&D as the most important determinants of TFP 
growth.19 Low levels of human capital stock limit growth 
opportunities for companies and correspondingly can slow 
down economic development thereby endangering a country 
competitiveness. Skill gaps affect further development as a 
domestic supply-side constraint, but also deterring foreign 
investment and technological upgrading by firms.20 Various 
externalities determine underinvestment in human capital 
and a consequent persistence of skill gaps ultimately trapping 
countries. Efforts to strengthen R&D activities21 and quality of 
human resources are essential for facilitating the transition 
from a labor-surplus to a labor-shortage economy, the 
transition from input-driven growth to TFP-based growth, and 
for upgrading the industrial and export structure to high-skill 
and technology-intensive products.
Other studies stress the role of institutions, infrastructure, 
macroeconomic fundamentals, demographics, level of 
economic diversification and trade structure on TFP growth. 
Rodrik emphasises the role of high-quality institutions 
including: good governance; corporate governance; wide 
participation of various stakeholders in the policy decision 
process; effective co-operation among academics, businesses, 
and government in the formation of strategy for strengthening 
international competitiveness; efficient and transparent 
relationship between government and businesses; and 
increasing investment in R&D. Rodrik also emphasises the 
need of qualified bureaucrats and a strong private sector for 
building high-quality institutions, which are also necessary for 
the improvement of human capital over time and the upgrade 
of industrial structure towards skill-intensiveness. Infrastructure 
play a role per se on TFP growth, but it is also instrumental to 
boost human capital. Telecommunications for example are 
paramount to develop a knowledge economy.22
17   ‘Beyond the Middle-Income Trap’, Transition Report 2017-2018.
18   Eichengreen B., Park D., Shin K. (2012) ‘When Fast-Growing Economies Slow Down: 
International Evidence and Implications for China’, Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, Vol. 11(1), 
pp. 42-87, available online at <https://www.nber.org/papers/w16919.pdf>.
19   Kim, J., Park J. (2017) ‘The Role of Total Factor…’, quoted.
20   Saner R., You L., Gopinathan S. (2014) ‘Policy Debate. Learning to Grow Beyond the 
Middle-Income Trap – Singapore as an Export Model?’, International Development Policy | Revue 
internationale de politique de développement, available online at <http://journals.openedition.
org/poldev/1803>.
21   Tran, V.T. (2013) ‘The Middle-Income Trap’, quoted.
22  Rodrick D., (2007) One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Paus highlighted the role of global context and inequality 
on MIT.23 The rise of China compounded with an increasing 
competitive pressure and speed of technological change has 
changed the global architecture of production. Such a dramatic 
change made it more challenging for a middle-income country 
with limited innovation capabilities to increase TFP, overcome 
MIT and catch up with high income countries. Internally, high 
income inequality may lead to unequal access to education 
which, in turn, limits the accumulation of the human capital 
needed for innovation. Moreover, high inequality may result 
into political instability making difficult to implement any 
long-term development strategy.
Among other determinants of MIT should also be included 
the rigidity of a country to change growth patterns, having lost 
their competitive advantage such as from low manufacturing 
labor costs in the case of some ASEAN countries. More broadly, 
the ability to formulate and implement new policies consistent 
with the evolving challenges of a country moving from one 
income status to the next influences significantly the chances 
to avoid or overcome MIT. 
Escaping the middle-income trap
According to the ‘Growth Report’ by the Growth 
Commission, only 13 countries were able to escape MIT since 
the 60’s, and five of them are in East Asia – Japan, Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.24 The experience of some of 
these countries can support the reflection within ASEAN on 
how to address ongoing MIT or the risk to be trapped.
A first key factor underlying the success of the 
East Asian economies that were able to transition from 
middle to high-income status was their ability to push 
the technological frontier and move from imitating and 
importing foreign technologies to innovating technologies of 
their own. The creation of a large framework for innovation 
based on technological learning, public sector support of 
R&D investments and strong intellectual property rights 
protections have been a major factor in facilitating this 
homebased innovation. Conversely, the ASEAN countries at 
middle-income level tend to just import foreign technologies 
and the level of investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP is 
still very low. Malaysia figure was the highest among these 
countries, but it was only 1% in 2012, compared with 4% 
for Korea in the same year and 2.27% ten years earlier.25 The 
performance of R&D activities has been partly reflected in the 
number of patents granted. As expected, the gap between 
the current situation of ASEAN and that of Korea in the 1980s 
23  Paus, E. (2017) ‘Escaping the Middle-Income Trap’, quoted.
24  Commission on Growth and Development (2008), The Growth Report. Strategies for 
Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development, Washington D.C.: The International Bank for 
Reconstrution and Development.
25  See World Bank Open Data.
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is large. The average annual number of patents granted to 
Korea in the 1980’s and 1990’s was around 8,000, while the 
current average in ASEAN is less then 1,000.26
The results of R&D activities have to be commercialised 
through product and process innovation employing high-
quality human resources, in particular tertiary graduates 
with strong industrial technical skills and background 
in engineering. The current situation of ASEAN middle-
income economies is different from the case of Korea in the 
1980s and 1990s. First, the current average enrolment rate 
of ASEAN middle-income countries is below 50%, while 
Korea reached this level already in 1996 and was above 70% 
in 1999. Second, and more importantly, in Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia, graduates in industry fields such as 
engineering, manufacturing, and construction accounted for 
only approximately 10% of all graduates,27 while the share of 
social sciences in total graduates was as high as about 40%. In 
contrast, the situation in Korea in 1999 was reversed.
Another interesting lesson for Korea comes from the 
public private coordination in supporting innovation. Korean 
firms, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
have emphasized the development of technology and R&D 
activities since the early 1980s.28 This positive behavior of 
private firms has been enhanced by government policy. The 
Government of the Republic of Korea has supported private 
R&D by giving tax credits, allowing accelerated depreciation, 
and lowering import tariffs. R&D activities have been directly 
conducted by the government since the mid-1960s. However, 
since the early 1980s the emphasis has gradually shifted to the 
private sector and the role of government has been to provide 
incentives through fiscal and trade policies.
With a significant R&D effort and high quality of human 
resources, ASEAN middle-income economies can be expected 
to upgrade their industrial structure to high skill-intensive 
products and improve over time their competitiveness in 
international markets.
Other important lessons learnt concern infrastructures, 
labor market and trade. All East Asian economies that 
were able to escape the middle-income trap succeeded 
in developing advanced infrastructure networks, 
particularly in the form of high-speed communications 
and broadband technology. Thanks to the liberalisation 
of telecommunications networks and related regulatory 
framework reforms, a number of countries in the region 
have been able to develop and enhance the availability of 
information and communications services.29
26  See data provided by World Intellectual Property Organisation at <https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017-chapter2.pdf>.
27  Tran, V.T. (2013) ‘The Middle-Income Trap’, quoted.
28 Ibid.
29 Gill, I., Kharas H., (2007) An East Asian Renaissance, quoted.
Flexible labor markets and open economic policies have 
allowed for the reallocation of labor across sectors within 
the most successful economies in the region. Countries in 
the region have relied extensively on international trade to 
accelerate their labor transfer by inserting themselves into 
the labor-intensive segments of global value chains. Such a 
transfer was facilitated by advances in ICTs and by decreasing 
transport costs and lowering international trade barriers.30 This 
labor market flexibility has facilitated the new labor transition, 
now increasingly towards innovative occupations.
Finally, escaping MIT requires an effective policy-
making cycle able to transform in reality the ideas previously 
discussed. Few key principles should be understood, 
interiorized and nurtured at all different layers of the 
government and other stakeholders involved in economic 
reforms. First, policy formulation and implementation should 
not be handled separately. They are part of the same process. 
Therefore, the policy formulation cannot be left only to the 
ministers and few international consultants. Representative 
of all stakeholders involved in a new policy implementation 
should participate since its inception. Second, policy making 
exercises aimed at addressing MIT should be problem-driven 
and based on a mechanism of trial and errors. Third, while it is 
easy to find best practices that worked well in other countries 
at other times, a copy paste process would inevitably fail in 
addressing the specific evolving economic complexity of a 
country facing MIT today or tomorrow. The experience of 
other countries is there only to inspire policy makers in finding 
their own solutions which should be fully customized to their 
specific country and current global context. Similarly, it is 
important avoiding the temptation to create institutions that 
just mimic the form of performing ones without developing 
the actual operational functions.
30 Agénor P.R., Canuto O., Jelenic M. (2012) ‘Avoiding Middle-Income Growth…’, quoted.
Source: World Bank, WDI
GNI per capita, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia and Vietnam (current USD)
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Sustaining
the Planet 
for our Future
Generations
 by H.E. Don Pramudwinai  
I
n the digital age and in the present context of the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), we often hear about 
‘big data’ and the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), which to some 
may sound highly technical and virtually digital. While Thailand 
is fully aware of the opportunities and challenges that come 
with modernity, we also seek an all-encompassing human 
dimension of inclusive development, particularly during our 
year as ASEAN Chair. This is why we came up with the theme 
‘Advancing Partnership for Sustainability’, to promote the 
‘Sustainability of Things’ (SoT), which means sustainability in all 
dimensions.
Sustainable development is an overarching concept 
that is directly related to the SoT. However, the first aspect 
of sustainability that usually springs to mind for the public is 
environmental sustainability, which is a significant component 
of the concept and part of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. The 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) are simply grouped into the so-called ‘5Ps’, with 
the ultimate goal of saving the planet, fostering peace, creating 
prosperity, enhancing partnership, and nourishing our people.
With regard to the planet, fresh air and clean water are 
among the fundamental essentials for human beings and all 
other creatures that share this world with us. Sadly, Mother 
Earth has been harmed and taken for granted by human 
beings more than anyone else throughout history. The fact 
that several SDGs attach importance to the rehabilitation 
and conservation of our planet reflects rising environmental 
concerns and the call for more balanced development, widely 
known as the concept of ‘circular economy’, which is gaining 
ground globally.
Thailand assumes that enhancing environmental 
sustainability is inextricably linked to social and economic 
development, and it is one of the key conditions for sustainable 
development. We have therefore adopted measures to 
conserve, restore and manage our natural resources and 
environment in a more sustainable manner, and included 
these elements in our 20-Year National Strategy Framework 
(2017-2036).
For instance, Thailand has launched the Nationally 
Determined Contribution Roadmap on Mitigation (2021-
Conclusion
Determinants of growth at low and high income levels 
may be different. If countries struggle to transition from 
growth strategies that are effective at low income levels to 
those effective at high income levels, they may stagnate at 
some middle income level.
MIT has become the great concern of ASEAN, but it is not 
unavoidable. Examples of East Asian economies that were able 
to transition from middle-income status to high-income status 
based on their ability to increase total factor productivity are 
there to prove it, but they cannot be simply copied. What is 
needed is a timely shift of policy focus and an effective policy-
making cycle. Governments should act early, not when the 
benefits of cheap labor and the gains from imitating foreign 
technology are already exhausted. The government strategy 
should be based on timely implementation of public policies 
aimed at improving access to advanced infrastructure, 
enhancing the protection of property rights, and reforming 
labor markets. These policies are central to fostering 
technological learning, attracting talented individuals into 
R&D activities, and encouraging the creation of national and 
international knowledge networks.
While the problem for high middle-income countries such 
as Malaysia and Thailand is in promoting innovation-oriented 
policy to maintain international competitiveness to avoid the 
trap, the problem for the low middle-income countries such 
as Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia is strengthening 
basic infrastructure and institutions, promoting market and 
private sector development and ensuring equal competition 
among economic actors for efficient use of capital, land, and 
other resources. However, all ASEAN countries should not only 
stride to identify ‘what to do’ to address MIT, but also consider 
carefully ‘how’ to formulate and implement their new policies 
and check the health their policy-making cycle. Ministries’ 
desks of stagnating economies are full of wonderful policies 
not implemented.
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2030) to ensure that we meet our targets on the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions by 20% to 25% by 2030. Some 
progress has been made so far. Last year, we managed to 
reduce the emission of 45.72 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, 
or 12% of the target, i.e., 20% by 2020. Moreover, about 24 
hectares of coral reefs and 880 hectares of mangrove forest 
were rehabilitated, and the use of over 435 million plastic bags 
was reduced since 2017.
Beyond our national undertakings, Thailand has 
consistently advocated co-operation with the global 
community on environmental issues to derive long-term 
benefits. An example is our firm commitment to the Paris 
Agreement to address climate change. At the same time, 
Thailand has been co-operating with all partners to exchange 
knowledge, experiences and best practices.
Sustainable development is a global agenda that requires 
concerted efforts, and Thailand is in a position to drive it 
forward this year. In addition to being ASEAN Chair, Thailand 
is also ASEAN Coordinator on Sustainable Development 
Co-operation, actively identifying the complementarities 
and promoting closer coordination between ASEAN and 
the United Nations. One substantial outcome is that of the 
complementarities between the ‘ASEAN Community Vision 
2025’ and the ‘2030 United Nations Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’, which identifies potential synergy and means to 
strengthen ASEAN Community-building while simultaneously 
attaining several SDGs.
A recommendation from the Complementarities Report 
that will be fully realised this year is the establishment of 
the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and 
Dialogue in Thailand. The Centre will be funded by the Royal 
Thai Government and will help to coordinate activities and 
projects related to the Complementarities Initiative, while 
linking up with similar centres in ASEAN member states to 
form a network of centres in support of regional sustainable 
development efforts.
During Thailand’s ASEAN Chairmanship, one of the 
sustainable development agendas that will be addressed is 
that of the marine environment. Thailand is greatly concerned 
with the problem of marine debris and its impact on the 
environment. We truly believe that urgent action is needed. 
Researchers have found an area of marine debris or ‘garbage 
patch’ in the middle of the Pacific Ocean that is larger than 
Bangkok. This debris is eaten by fish, which are then consumed 
by people, causing severe health problems. News reports of 
sea animals such as whales and turtles suffering as a result of 
eating indigestible waste cover only a fraction of the 100,000 
deaths of marine animals that occur annually as a result of 
this problem. In addition, marine debris affects the promotion 
of environmentally friendly tourism and thus affects the 
contribution of the tourism sector to national development.
Research by Thailand’s Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment found that rubbish that is thrown into the 
sea can travel all over the world. It is therefore imperative 
that we have a platform for discussion and collaboration 
to tackle the problem. A technical working group meeting 
among ASEAN members was held in November 2017.The 
Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Marine Debris and 
the ‘ASEM High-level Meeting on Marine Sustainability’ were 
hosted on 5 March and 7-8 March 2019, respectively. Thus, 
Thailand is advancing partnership in this field by starting with 
environmental sustainability, and is willing to expand to other 
areas throughout the year.
The benefits of sustainable development are countless 
but each country should embark on its own path and 
determination to achieve the goals. In Thailand’s case, the 
‘Sufficiency Economy Philosophy’ (SEP) has been adopted 
as its home-grown approach. This philosophy, conferred by 
His Majesty the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej, proposes a 
‘thinking process’ consisting of three parts: analysis of the 
cause of the problem, identification of practical solutions, and 
implementation of the selected solutions.
SEP is mainstreamed in Thailand’s policy, at both 
the national and the international levels. It has been a 
guiding principle in Thailand’s national economic and 
social development plans since 2002 and its application to 
achieve sustainable development. Thailand has shared this 
philosophy with many countries as an alternative approach 
to attaining the SDGs, through the provision of training 
courses and the establishment of several co-operative 
projects in Asia and Africa.
In conclusion, Thailand’s commitment to sustainable 
development is steadfast, as demonstrated in our past 
achievements and contributions, both nationally and 
internationally. We are committed to doing more. The 
agenda will be particularly important during our ASEAN 
Chairmanship, and Thailand looks forward to working with 
colleagues in ASEAN and beyond in a global partnership as 
set forth in the 17 SDGs.
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Ambassador’s 
Overview on 
Indonesian-Italian 
Relations
 by H.E. Esti Andayani  
I
ndonesia, situated in Southeast Asia, is the world’s largest 
archipelagic country, comprising around 17,000 islands 
and inhabited by almost 260 million people, making 
Indonesia the country with the fourth-largest population in 
the world. The Republic of Indonesia is blessed with abundant 
natural resources and cultural heritage.
It is also considered the third-largest democracy in the 
world, with direct voting for both presidential and parliamentary 
elections. There were around 190 million registered voters at 
the last general election, on 17 April 2019, with approximately 
150 million turning out to vote directly for the president, vice 
president, and members of parliament on that day.
With regard to bilateral relations between Indonesia and 
Italy, throughout the years the two countries have enjoyed a 
stable partnership. The cordial relations and good friendship 
between the two countries have flourished since 1949, with 
Italy being one of the first European countries to acknowledge 
the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.
Co-operation between the two countries has continuously 
shown positive notes, particularly since 2009, when both 
countries signed a bilateral agreement on Bilateral Consultation 
Forum. Various high-level official meetings have been held 
between Indonesia and Italy. At the presidential level, apart from 
meetings on the sidelines of international conferences, President 
Sergio Mattarella visited Indonesia on November 2015. This was 
the first visit to Indonesia by an Italian president, and it served as 
an important step in advancing bilateral relations.
In addition to numerous exchanges of visits at the ministerial 
level, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Retno L.P. Marsudi, visited 
Rome on 9 October 2017, while on 7 February 2018, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Angelino 
Alfano, visited Jakarta. Undersecretary Manlio Di Stefano also 
visited Indonesia in December 2018 as Head of Delegation for 
the Bali Democracy Forum. He also had the opportunity to meet 
Foreign Minister Marsudi.
I am pleased to note that Indonesia and Italy have enjoyed 
co-operation in the fields of defence, economics, trade and 
investment, sociocultural, and tourism. In the economic field, 
Indonesia and Italy recorded total trade of USD3.76 billion during 
2018, USD1.92 billion of which was made up of Indonesian 
exports to Italy, while Indonesia imported USD1.84 billion. These 
data make Italy Indonesia’s third-biggest trade partner in the 
European Union (EU). 2018 also saw USD32.09 million of Italian 
investment in 187 projects in Indonesia, making Italy the ninth-
largest investor from the EU.
Meanwhile, in the tourism sector, Italy is the fifth-largest 
contributor of European tourists to Indonesia, with 94,232 Italian 
tourists having come to Indonesia during 2018. This number 
shows an increase of almost 4.6% on the same period in the 
previous year.
This year the Republic of Indonesia and the Italian Republic 
are expected to commemorate the 70th anniversary of their 
diplomatic relations. The two countries will collaborate in various 
activities to celebrate this historic occasion. We have planned 
events to be held throughout 2019 that focus on the creative 
economy and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which 
have been agreed by both foreign ministers as the themes of 
this year’s commemoration.
At the regional level, Indonesia acknowledges ASEAN as the 
cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. As one of the founding 
members of ASEAN, Indonesia places great importance on 
maintaining peace and stability in the region, as well as enhancing 
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co-operation among members of ASEAN, be it in the political, 
economic or sociocultural sector. This policy also translates to all 
Indonesian missions abroad, including the Indonesian Embassy 
in Rome. We always maintain strong friendships and co-operation 
with all ASEAN missions through the ASEAN Committee in Rome 
(ACR) and its various events. Together with other ACR missions, 
we also aim to increase understanding of ASEAN by the Italian 
public and enhance relations between Italy and ASEAN countries. 
This is done through many events in co-operation with various 
institutions in Italy.
Italy and Malaysia
Relations:
Opportunities
for the Future
 by H.E. Abdul Malik Melvin Castelino  
R
elations between Malaysia and Italy have always had 
good momentum and have escalated positively since 
1957. The past 62 years have been productive for 
many areas of co-operation, namely defence, education, trade 
and investment, as well as tourism. As for this latter sector, I 
am pleased to announce that Malaysia is becoming a favoured 
destination for Italians, with 55,000 Italian tourists having visited 
Malaysia in 2018. Malaysia is a nation of 32 million and is rich 
in culture and heritage. Under the new government, Malaysia 
strives to uphold international law and integrity and curb 
corruption within the rule of law. At the same time, it continues 
to develop close and friendly relations with like-minded 
countries and play an important role in international forums. 
Malaysia is a multiracial, multireligious and multicultural country 
and its identity encompasses a vast array of languages, cuisines 
and traditions.
I wish to highlight that Malaysia is currently riding on an 
ecosystem approach to lure investment, and not just within 
the country – it is also leveraging the competitive advantages 
of other ASEAN member states to create more vibrant and 
accessible investment opportunities. Given ASEAN’s vast 
consumer market and the increased development of member 
countries, companies located in Malaysia can leverage the 
country’s proximity to these markets and create a strong 
customer presence in the region.
As Malaysia moves up the value chain, we are looking for 
more innovation-based, knowledge–intensive projects within 
high-growth, high-value industries. Having built a strong 
industrial ecosystem over the years, we are now more targeted 
in our investment promotion efforts, specifically by focusing on 
quality investments that will accelerate and sustain the nation’s 
economic growth. As a trading nation with an open economy, 
Malaysia welcomes all foreign investments, including those 
from Italy that meet our aspirations of becoming a developed 
nation. In this regard, Malaysia would like to strengthen its 
already strong relations with Italy by opening the door to trade 
and investment with Italy, and further to encourage Italian 
businesses – particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs) – 
to explore the many lucrative opportunities in Malaysia.
As of June 2018, a total of 73 manufacturing projects 
involving Italy’s participation had been implemented, with 
investments amounting to EUR300 million, and Italy is ranked 
as the seventh-largest investor in Malaysia from Europe. 
Investors are welcome to look at Malaysia as their gateway to 
the enormous ASEAN market and beyond. ASEAN is a regional 
organisation of ten economies and a combined population of 
more than 622 million that should become the fourth-largest 
single market in the world by 2030, after the United States, China 
and the European Union. On that note, I also wish to stress that 
we share Italy’s view that the best is through creating mutually 
beneficial and sustainable growth as well as increased co-
operation in trade and investment.
Myanmar-Italy
Encounters
 by H.E. Myint Naung  
M
yanmar is located in the Southeast Asian 
peninsula, one of the ten ASEAN member 
countries. It shares its borders with five countries, 
including the two largest Asian economies, China and India. 
In terms of size, Myanmar is twice as large as Italy, while Italy’s 
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population is 10 million larger than Myanmar’s. Myanmar’s 
strategic location offers a gateway to the Indian Ocean. The 
first Myanmar kingdom was established in the 11th century 
and kept its sovereignty until the 19th century, when the British 
colonized it. Myanmar regained its independence in 1948. 
Bilateral relations between Myanmar and Italy date back to the 
18th century, when King Mindon twice sent a delegation led 
by Kin Wun Min Gyi to visit Italy. Likewise, Father Paolo Matteo 
Abbona played an important role between the two countries as 
he prepared the bilateral commerce and friendship agreement 
that in 1871 was signed in Mandalay between the Burmese 
Empire and the Kingdom of Italy.
The two countries opened a new chapter of diplomatic 
relations in 1950, and established their own embassies in each 
other’s capitals in 1962. Former president of Myanmar H.E. U 
Thein Sein paid a state visit to Italy in 2013. In addition, he took 
part in the Asia-Europe Meeting together with other leaders in 
Milan in 2014. As part of the official programme, H.E. U Thein 
Sein also visited Turin for two days. Two years later, in 2016, 
former prime minister of Italy H.E. Mr Paolo Gentiloni also visited 
Myanmar. In 2017, H.E. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the 
International Parliamentarians’ Conference in Rome as a special 
guest.
Myanmar chiefly exports a vast array of commodities, 
including natural gas, timber, beans, pulses, seafood, clothes and 
jewellery, while it imports oil, vehicles, machinery, construction 
materials, fertilizers, pharmaceutical products and lubricants. 
China, Singapore, Thailand, Japan and India stand as Myanmar’s 
top trading partners.
As for bilateral trade with Italy, trade volume reached 
USD217 million in 2017-2018. Myanmar’s exports to Italy include 
clothes, shoes, timber, seafood, rice, beans and pulses, and 
forest products. Electronics, machinery, construction materials, 
scientific tools, agricultural products, glass and glassware, 
chemicals and vehicles are the main Italian exports to Myanmar.
Due to its unique geographical location, Myanmar 
represents a land bridge between South and Southeast Asia, 
while its proximity to the largest Asian emerging markets, 
abundant natural resources and human capital offer great 
potential for trade and investment.
The Philippine 
Ambassador’s View 
on Philippine-Italian 
Economic Relations
 by H.E. Domingo P. Nolasco  
P
hilippine-Italian co-operation has grown over the 
years since the establishment of diplomatic relations 
on 9 July 1947. The relationship has gradually 
expanded across its various aspects, including political and 
economic co-operation and people-to-people ties. I believe the 
bilateral relations can grow further and have yet to reach their 
full potential, especially in economic co-operation.
For example, trade between the Philippines and Italy has 
been growing strongly over recent years. Total trade between 
the two countries almost doubled between 2013 and 2018, 
rising to EUR867.8 million from EUR448.3 million.1 While the 
pace of trade growth is rapid, I believe that there is still a lot more 
room to grow.
The Philippines, as one of the fastest-growing economies 
in Asia, provides many opportunities to expand economic 
co-operation. The Philippine economy has grown by an 
annual average of 6.5% since 2012, characterised by sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals and driven by strong domestic 
consumption, government spending, and robust services and 
industry sectors. Currently, the Philippines is undertaking its Build 
Build Build programme, ushering in a golden age of Philippine 
infrastructure. A testament to the Philippine economy is the 
upgrade by Standard & Poor’s of the Philippines’ credit rating to 
BBB+ last April.
These factors, along with the country’s young, well-
educated working population, provide many opportunities for 
Italian companies to invest in the Philippines. This is in addition 
to the fact that the Philippines benefits from the ‘European 
Union’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus’ (EU-GSP+). 
Over 6,000 Philippine products enjoy zero tariffs when exported 
to the EU, making the Philippines a strategic and cost-effective 
source of imports for Italian companies.
1 All trade data are sourced from trademap.org, International Trade Center, 2018.
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Other aspects of economic relations have also seen positive 
developments over the years. Tourism has witnessed steady 
growth over the years, with a total of 35,178 Italian nationals 
visiting the Philippines in 2018, indicating a 15.6% increase on 
the previous year and about 77% growth since 2014.
The Philippines and Italy also enjoy strong people-to-people 
ties, on which economic co-operation can be built. Italy hosts 
the second-largest Filipino community in the EU. As of 1 January 
2018, there were 161,609 registered Filipinos in Italy according to 
Italian government data. This does not include dual citizens and 
therefore the Filipino footprint in Italy is likely to be larger.
While much has been achieved, I believe more can still be 
done. And both the Philippines and Italy have committed to doing 
more. In 2017, on the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations, 
the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding, 
creating the ‘Philippines–Italy Bilateral Consultations Mechanism’ 
(BCM). The BCM will facilitate regular meetings between the 
two governments in order to shepherd the bilateral relations. In 
October 2017, at the first meeting of the BCM, the two countries 
agreed to expand economic co-operation, seeing the sectors 
of agricultural machinery, infrastructure and textiles as possible 
areas of co-operation.
I look forward to continuous dialogue and engagement 
between the Philippines and Italy to jointly develop more 
opportunities for mutually beneficial forms of collaboration 
and business-to-business co-operation. I believe our countries 
are ready to advance their economic relationship into the new 
decade. potential for trade and investment.
Thailand and Italy: 
Old Friends,
New Possibilities
 by H.E. Chirdchu Raktabutr  
T
hailand and Italy celebrated the 150th anniversary 
of the establishment of their diplomatic ties in 
2018. On 3 October 1868, representatives of Their 
Majesties King Chulalongkorn of Siam (King Rama V) and King 
Vittorio Emanuele II of Italy signed the Treaty of Friendship 
and Commerce. Since then, Italy and Thailand have steadily 
cultivated friendly relations that have matured into mutual 
respect and partnership across different fields.
In recent years, Thailand and Italy have forged closer political 
ties. The first political consultation between the two countries 
took place in Rome in November 2016. Shortly thereafter, in 
February 2017, former Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano 
visited Bangkok. In March 2017, his Thai counterpart, His 
Excellency Don Pramudwinai, paid a return visit to Rome. The 
Thai Prime Minister, General Prayut Chan-o-cha, met with the 
Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, on the sidelines of the 
ASEM Summit in Brussels in October 2018. In June of this year, 
the Honourable Chief Justice Cheep Jullamon, President of the 
Supreme Court of Thailand, will be visiting Italy as the guest 
of the Honourable Giovanni Mammone, First President of the 
Supreme Court of Italy. He will also meet with the Honourable 
Roberto Fico, the President of the Chamber of Deputies.
At the same time, our private sectors are co-operating 
to increase bilateral trade and investment. The fifth meeting 
of the Italian-Thai Business Forum took place in Rome in May 
2019. Over 20 major Thai and Italian companies, responsible 
for USD2 billion’s worth of trade and investment between our 
two countries, gathered to discuss economic opportunities 
and improve business ties. Our economic relations continue 
to be dynamic despite the global economic slowdown and 
growing protectionism. Thailand’s Central Group’s investment in 
La Rinascente department stores has won praise for preserving 
an iconic Italian brand and employing more than 5,000 staff 
across Italy. Italian companies are actively participating in 
the development of Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor. 
Ferrovie dello Stato (FS Group) of Italy, together with CP Group 
of Thailand, has submitted a tender for the high-speed rail 
project linking Thailand’s three international airports. FS Group 
will soon open an office in Thailand. Moreover, Ducati Motor 
is considering opening a second factory in Thailand after the 
success of its first factory in Rayong Province. The world’s leading 
helicopter manufacturer, Leonardo Company, is also setting up 
an office in Thailand.
Thai-Italian bilateral trade averaged USD3,400 million per 
year between 2015 and 2017. In 2017, total trade between our 
two countries reached over USD3,700 million, an increase of 8% 
from 2016. Italy ranks 24th among Thailand’s most important 
trading countries, the fifth in the European Union after 
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France. By 
comparison, Thailand ranks 48th among Italy’s trading partners 
and second in ASEAN, behind Singapore.
Just as important as political and economic relations is 
cultural linkage, which plays a special role in fostering Thai–
Italian friendship. Historically, Italian architects and engineers 
were employed in the Court of Siam to help modernize the 
RISE Vol. 4 / N. 1 23
nation and build important structures such as Bangkok’s Hua 
Lampong railway station and Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall. 
At that time, opening Siam to Western culture was a way to 
show progress against a backdrop of colonialist expansion. 
These buildings have stood the test of time and have nowadays 
become a symbol of Italian influence on Thai architecture.
Our people-to-people contact is flourishing. Tourism plays 
a key role in encouraging the people of both countries to 
better understand and respect each other’s cultures. In 2018, 
more than 280,000 Italians visited Thailand, while 37,000 Thais 
visited Italy. The Italian language is taught at Thailand’s premier 
academic institutions including Chulalongkorn and Thammasat 
universities. Ca’ Foscari University in Venice is offering Thai 
language courses with a view to establishing a Thai studies 
programme in the coming year. 
It is clear that our state-to-state, people-to-people and 
business connections are growing steadily. Our long history 
of friendship and mutual goodwill provides a solid foundation 
for creating more opportunities to expand and deepen Thai-
Italian relations.
Bilateral
Relations between 
Viet Nam and Italy
 by H.E. Nguyen Thi Bich Hue  
I
n recent years, relations between Italy and ASEAN 
countries, including Viet Nam, have continued to develop 
fruitfully and productively. 2018 proved to be another 
excellent year for this thriving relationship. Viet Nam and Italy 
celebrated the 45th anniversary of diplomatic relations and five 
years since the establishment of a strategic partnership, marked 
by the visit of Deputy Prime Minister H.E. Truong Hoa Binh to 
Italy in October.
Viet Nam is gaining ever more attention from Italian 
investors and entrepreneurs. Nowadays it is one of the fastest-
growing economies in Asia, with a vibrant market of more than 
95 million consumers, an emerging middle class and a young, 
dynamic workforce. The growth rate in 2018 reached a ten-year 
high at 7.08%, leading to GDP per capita of USD2,540, up 6.3% 
year on year. Under a socialist-oriented market economy, Viet 
Nam’s economic structure is shifting towards modernisation 
and industrialization, with a shrinking share of agriculture and 
an increasing contribution of services and industrial production.
Beyond the Vietnamese government’s ongoing efforts 
towards economic reform, the country also consistently 
pursues a comprehensive integration policy with the focus 
placed on international economic integration. At this stage, 
Viet Nam has so far implemented and ratified 11 free trade 
agreements (FTAs), notably the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The country is 
preparing to complete, sign, ratify and enforce five other FTAs, 
including the European Union-Viet Nam FTA (EVFTA), a very 
promising agreement that could yield significant benefits for 
Italian businesses once it takes effect. Under the scope of this 
agreement, 99% tariffs on goods traded between the European 
market and Viet Nam will be eliminated, creating incentives 
and new playgrounds for EU companies who wish to invest 
in our country. Furthermore, as a member of many important 
economic co-operation mechanisms in the region and globally, 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC), etc., Viet Nam is committed to working with other 
partners, including Italy, towards a stable and predictable rule-
based multilateral trading regime that will positively contribute 
to the greater welfare and economic development of both our 
economies.
As ambassador to Italy, I make it one of my key goals to 
strengthen the relationship between Italy and Viet Nam, as well 
as with ASEAN as a whole. In doing so, through the launch of 
this journal, together with other joint activities, including the 
upcoming Third High-level Dialogue on ASEAN-Italy Economic 
Relations, which was held in Hanoi this June, I hope that they 
will provide essential catalysts to advance our partnership to the 
next level, bringing prosperity and new opportunities to all the 
people and entrepreneurs across our countries.
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BOOK REVIEW
 by Giuseppe Gabusi  
Mahbubani K., J. Sng, (2017) The ASEAN Miracle. A Catalyst 
for Peace, Singapore: NUS Press.
In 1993, The World Bank entitled its annual Development 
Report ‘The Asian Miracle’, with the original intention to 
acknowledge the specific economic path of countries like 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan. Now Kishore Mahbubani – an eminent 
scholar and diplomat from Singapore, author of the global 
bestseller The New Asian Emisphere – and Jeffrey Sng have 
written a book on the ‘ASEAN miracle’, meaning the success story 
of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations. Established in 1967 
with a clear anti-communist agenda by five states (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and The Philippines), after 50 years 
the Association is still with us with ten members, becoming – 
according to the authors – ‘the second most-successful regional 
organisation in the world’ after the European Union (EU). Is that 
true? Where is the evidence? What are the changes that ASEAN 
has to implement if it wants to adapt to the new challenges 
of the 21st century and celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2067?
In general, Western commentators and scholars have 
tended to define ASEAN as a useless or unfulfilled project 
of regional integration. On the one hand, ASEAN has been 
dismissed by realists as a mere ‘talking shop’ among national 
leaders, without any serious impact on countries’ own destinies. 
On the other hand, in the eyes of functionalists ASEAN has 
never lived up to its potential to unite Southeast Asia in a single 
supranational entity, comparable to the EU. The problem is – 
and this represents the core argument of the book – that ASEAN 
was never meant to become another EU, but by using the EU as 
a benchmark many commentators were blind to the significant 
achievements that ASEAN has obtained, probably against all 
odds: ‘What makes ASEAN truly remarkable is not just that it was 
born in unpromising times and nurtured on unpromising soil. If 
ASEAN had been a human baby, it might have not reached full 
term. Instead, the precarious baby became a world star’ (p. 6).
Indeed, Mahbubani and Sng show how lessons can be 
drawn from the ASEAN experience. Start with history: thanks to 
its geographical – mostly maritime – comparative advantage, 
Southeast Asia has been at the crossroads of the world (and 
of civilizations) for over 2,000 years. Four major cultural waves 
have hit the shores of the region – namely, Indian, Chinese, 
Muslim and Western. Three of them travelled peacefully across 
Southeast Asia, and the authors – as they were removing a 
pebble from their shoes – underline how it was only the fourth 
one that arrived ‘on a tide of violence’ (p. 12). It is remarkable then 
that in such a complex cultural landscape, on which colonialism 
has impressed a lot of scars, ASEAN has become an ‘ecosystem 
of peace’: contrary to many doomsday’s voices, Southeast Asia 
has never been ‘Balkanised’, nor it has seen the disruption of 
state structures due to sectarian violence like in the Middle 
East. Furthermore, ASEAN has taken profit of the favourable 
geopolitical situation – mainly, the U.S.-China rapprochement 
in the 1980s – to position itself at the center of all multilateral 
institutions in East Asia ‘civilizing’ the giant (close and far-away) 
neighbours, to the point that ‘all the great powers, including 
America, China, India, Japan and the EU, have a stake in keeping 
ASEAN together’ (p. 13).
Thanks to its economic ‘miracle’, ASEAN is now bound to 
overcome the growing pessimism in the West about the future, 
because, building on permanent consultation and consensus, 
ASEAN members have thrived, while at the same time tolerating 
each other’s differences: for Mahbubani and Sng ASEAN is really 
a ‘microcosm of our global conditions’ (p. 1). They argue that the 
regional bloc’s strength now and in the future is precisely to 
have learnt how to manage diversity – a skill to be appreciated in 
a world fast becoming multi-civilisational. For all these reasons, 
the authors suggest that ASEAN should – like the EU once – be 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
The ASEAN Miracle does not skip dealing with ASEAN’s 
weaknesses and shortcomings. First, the ‘absence of a natural 
custodian’ (p. 184), i.e. the role played in Europe by France and 
Germany: Indonesia could be the most likely candidate, but 
the Indonesian establishment is not unanimously convinced 
that Jakarta should lead ASEAN. Second, the absence of strong 
institutions: there is no enforcement mechanism for decisions, ‘no 
monitoring of compliance, and no sanctions’ (p. 188). Third, the 
budget of the association is quite limited. As this were not enough, 
the book lists a series of threats, like the rapidly deteriorating 
geopolitical context, where U.S.-China relations have deteriorated, 
shrinking the room to manoeuvre of the ASEAN member states, 
and the strong domestic focus of their leaders.
And yet the reader is convinced that a region – and the world 
– without ASEAN would fare much worse. The two authors have 
been in fact Singaporean diplomats, and they often know what 
really went on behind the scenes – apparently, in a few cases like 
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in the aftermath of the ‘Cyclone Nargis’ in Myanmar and in the 
2008 temple dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, ASEAN 
leaders managed to avert major crises.
However, the book does also remind ASEAN that it cannot 
stand still if the organisation wants to survive. A project always 
owned by the government elite should now create a sense 
of ownership also among the people. Even though it cannot 
become ‘the East Asia’s EU’, it should turn in a proper institution, 
starting from a bigger empowerment of the ASEAN Secretariat 
through an increase in pro-quota budget contributions. And 
finally, it should be promoted as ‘a beacon for humanity.’ Well-
balanced, informed and thought-provoking, The ASEAN Miracle 
is also a subtle and fascinating (self-promoting) critique of 
Western perspectives in Southeast Asian. Will the future be 
ASEAN? Nobody really knows, but if the search of the future 
global order in Asia and beyond needs any guide, this is one of 
the best books to start from.
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